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THE CHANGING SHAPE OF GOVERNMENT
MS. METZGER: Hello. I am very pleased to be moderating
this first panel on "The Changing Shape of Government." How to
secure government accountability in the context of the expansion
of privatization in government is a question central to our discus-
sion today. Some aspects of this question pertain to political ac-
countability: Does privatization lead to the undermining of
traditional controls, in terms of either requirements or methods for
participation in government decisions, because the entities that
were providing government services are now outside of those re-
gimes? Or, does it actually provide, for example, an opportunity to
increase accountability by bringing private citizens into govern-
ment and developing new methods of delivering services and in
other ways transcending the public/private divide?
This first panel will provide background on that question by dis-
cussing some of the changes we are seeing in government institu-
tions and in the ways government operates. The panelists will
describe ways in which the move toward privatization and the ex-
pansion of the gray area between public and private is occurring,
but also will talk about changes we may see as being particularly
useful in dealing with some of the challenges this expansion of
privatization presents.
On this panel we have five scholars who have written extensively
on public administration and administrative law generally, as well
as privatization, specifically. We will begin with Dean Alfred
Aman of the Indiana University School of Law. Our second panel-
ist will be Professor Steve Savas, who is a Professor of the School
of Public Affairs at Baruch College; then, Professor Elliott Sclar,
who is a Professor of Urban Planning and Public Affairs at Colum-
bia University; then, Professor Lester Salamon of The Johns Hop-
kins University and Director of the Johns Hopkins Center for Civil
Society Studies; and, finally, Professor Charles Sabel of Columbia
Law School. After each presentation, we will have a few minutes
for brief comments and then questions.
DEAN AMAN: Thank you very much. It is a great pleasure to
be here.
In my paper I analyze the privatization of traditional govern-
ment services by placing these changes in governance in a global
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context.' The connections between private prisons and globaliza-
tion may appear, at first glance, somewhat tenuous. What do such
intensely domestic institutions as prisons have to do with the global
economy? I address that question in a three-part discussion.
Part I of my article argues that privatization of governmental
services is very much of a piece with deregulatory trends in the
United States and elsewhere, in which state-centered approaches
to a variety of regulatory problems increasingly have given way to
markets and market discourses at all levels of government.2
The reasons for the shift from states to markets are many and
complex, but they involve much more than simply a cyclical swing
of the regulatory pendulum from liberal to conservative. Rather,
the shift in perspective in the fundamental ways in which govern-
ment conceives of and then carries out its responsibilities is closely
tied to how decision makers at all levels of the public and private
sectors conceptualize globalization. The privatization of govern-
mental services is part of an economic conception of globalization,
one based on markets and the competition that they engender.
These various markets differ, however, and some of them can be
seen as more metaphorical than real. Some markets are more of
an alternative form of regulation of public responsibility than a
substitution of something wholly private for something that once
was wholly public.
In Part II of the article, I consider the effects of such privatiza-
tion trends on the public/private distinction itself and its implica-
tions for democracy in general. The democracy problem under
globalization-namely, the diminishing of transparency, the dimin-
ishing of opportunities for public participation, and, in particular,
the diminishing of information flows that make public participation
meaningful-is one of the most significant externalities of global-
ization. This externality arises from the disjunction between global
economic and political processes, on the one hand, and local
processes of democratic participation, on the other.
The global economy and the competition it engenders encour-
ages cost-cutting on the part of both private and public sectors.4
When cost-cutting occurs by way of privatization in the public sec-
1. Dean Aman's discussion is based upon an article, appearing in its entirety,
infra this volume of the Fordham Urban Law Journal. Alfred C. Aman Jr., Privatiza-
tion and the Democracy Problem in Globalization: Making Markets More Accountable
Through Administrative Law, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1477 (2001).
2. Id. at Part I.
3. Id. at Part II.
4. Id. at Introduction.
1320
SYMPOSIUM
tor, the democracy problem intensifies.5 In effect, this gives regula-
tion or public responsibility over to the market. It is a kind of
delegation of administrative authority to the market, which is usu-
ally treated as private, meaning that the public is no longer collec-
tively involved in the decision making processes.
There are many types of markets and various forms of democ-
racy. One of the goals of this article is to match the different types
of markets with different types of democracies, different types of
accountability and participation-including administrative democ-
racy as well as contractual democracy. To this end, I discuss some
of the reforms I think are worth considering.6
First, we need to privatize the Administrative Procedures Act.7
We need not take it out of government; rather, we need to extend
some of its principles and approaches to the private sector and to
those public/private entities that are carrying out public-related
functions. In so doing, we need not reinvent the wheel. It is im-
portant to devise cost-effective procedural approaches appropriate
for the global era of administrative law.
Second, we need to get beyond the state action/due process
kinds of rationales, partly because we are in this gray area, as Pro-
fessor Diller pointed out,8 and also because public law protections
have diminished, especially as they relate to prisoners and the
poor.
Third, and most important, we need to reconceptualize the way
we think about the administrative process. We must focus on par-
ticipation and transparency in ways that go beyond the simplistic
labeling of an actor as public or private. Rather, it is more impor-
tant to look at the power relationships between the parties-public
or private-and the kinds of information flows that we, as citizens,
need to understand whether our public functions are being carried
out in humane and effective ways. To this end, my paper focuses
on different markets and different forms of democracy. To make
these points, I develop the concept of "global currency."
The more metaphorical markets become, the greater the risk we
run that certain kinds of global currencies may be illegitimate. We
5. Id.
6. Id. at Part I.C.
7. Id. at Part lI.C; 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1994).
8. Dean Aman is referring to Professor Matthew Diller's introduction to this
Symposium. Matthew Diller, Introduction, in Symposium, Redefining the Public Sec-
tor: Accountability and Democracy in the Era of Privatization, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.
1307 (2001).
9. Aman, supra note 1, at Part I.A.
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need to have public input into such outcomes. Investment is essen-
tially mobile. To attract investment to a particular place or to raise
political capital, by appearing to be cost-effective and efficient or
actually by being cost-effective and efficient, governments at all
levels need to create global currency. Global currency is the
means by which governmental units at all levels-local, state, and
national-create competitive advantages to attract investment, to
retain the means to achieve sustained economic growth in their re-
spective jurisdictions. Global currency is, in effect, the price gov-
ernment is willing to pay to remain economically competitive on
behalf of the residents already living in the area and investing in
the jurisdiction, as well as to attract new investors of all kinds.
The most common form of currency is money generated from
the provision of fewer, or more efficiently provided, governmental
services, or both, lower taxes, lower regulatory cost, investments in
infrastructure, and the human capital necessary to stimulate eco-
nomic growth.
Not all forms of global currency are legitimate. If, for example, a
competitive edge arises due to a lack of constitutional rights for
prisoners in privatized prisons, we, as a body politic, would not
think that was an appropriate or a legitimate form of global cur-
rency.10 Child labor, poor wages, and unsafe working conditions
also, in various contexts, are illegitimate forms of currency." They
provide a competitive advantage to a particular location and to
some individuals associated with it, but the cost is usually borne by
people who are unable to choose other alternatives or are unaware
of the true cost of the "bargain" being struck for them.
Conceptualizing globalization primarily in economic competitive
terms easily can reinforce a domestic political discourse that favors
markets over government intervention and individualism over
communitarian approaches in the public sector. 2 But the move to
privatization can be disentangled from these ideological goals and
beliefs. To explain more fully why the public/private distinction
can be applied in new and democratic ways, I differentiate between
10. E.g., Hard Times, A Special Report: Profits at a Juvenile Prison Come With a
Chilling Cost, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1998, at Al.
11. See generally Katherine Cox, The Inevitability of Nimble Fingers? Law, Devel-
opment, and Child Labor, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 115, 128-29 (1999); JEAN
DREZ8_ & AMARTYA SEN, INDIA ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL OPPORTU-
NITY, 13-16 (1995); SASKIA SASSEN, THE MOBILITY OF LABOR AND CAPITAL (1988).
12. Aman, supra note 1.
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different kinds of markets and democracies. 3 Governments at
every level can be viewed as territorially-bounded economic units
attempting to maximize their resources and to compete effectively
with other economic units, whether those are other states, other
municipalities, the county next door, or some country halfway
around the world.
It does not always follow that the scale of governmentally-run
services is efficient. It may be more efficient to provide certain
services if the unit of service is larger or if you can combine forces
with other government agencies to avoid duplication. Given the
territorial constraints of governmental units, private actors often
are in better positions to conceptualize problems and implement
solutions that are not linked to arbitrary territorial boundaries. 4
This is one reason why, in theory, contracting out certain services
to private entities can yield efficiencies beyond what even an effi-
cient governmental unit might provide.
These efficiencies are even greater if a private unit, capable of
operating in many jurisdictions at once, can count on minimal, or at
least, certain kinds of uniform regulatory costs throughout the ser-
vice area. So there is a pressure for harmonization, and many
times market approaches harmonize more easily than complicated
regulatory approaches.
Finally, low-tax approaches at all levels of government may be
politically popular and help attract and retain some businesses.
However, they obviously yield scarce resources while forcing gov-
ernmental units to seek new efficiencies through the reallocation of
their resources, as well as re-engineering. These governmental cuts
in expenditures usually pose difficult questions. But when you
make the decision to move to the market, the market itself can
then take care of a lot of these acts because, theoretically, such
change is now impersonal. The market is not an elected official
saying, "I am making a decision to cut these expenditures."
Rather, such an approach says: "The market requires that we have
fewer sources or fewer employees." There is a kind of neutrality
that is built into some kinds of market decisions, which encourages
privatization. If you are going to have scarcity and someone is go-.
ing to allocate scarcity, politicians like to allocate it in a non-
13. Aman, supra note 1, at Part II.B (comparing classic consumer markets to regu-
latory, more administrative markets).
14. Aman, supra note 1, at Part I.B.
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threatening, neutral way, in which they are not necessarily the
cause of the adverse effects of the decisions involved.15
In short, the economic logics that apply to privatization at na-
tional, state, and local levels are similar to those that apply at the
international level. The multiplicity of jurisdictions, the inherent
limitations of territorially-bounded governmental units, the relative
freedom, flexibility, and efficiency of private actors, and the need
to conserve funds and create global currencies with which to com-
pete in a global economy all militate in favor of different forms of
privatization.
Markets bring discipline and anonymity. They also bring uni-
formity, as well as a means of making difficult political decisions in
relatively impersonal ways. But I think one of the challenges in my
field, administrative law, is to make these markets accountable and
not to treat all markets the same. It is important to recognize that
there is a kind of market rhetoric, a market discourse, requiring
public input and accountability. Such markets and privatized ser-
vices present a challenge to us to reconceptualize administrative
law in ways that now extend procedures and participatory opportu-
nities, in an efficient, thoughtful way, to what once was thought of
as the "private sector."
MS. METZGER: Thank you very much.
Professor Savas?
PROFESSOR SAVAS: Privatization is changing the shape of
government.16 Privatization means relying more on the private in-
stitutions of society and less on government to satisfy public needs.
Society's private institutions include: (1) the marketplace and orga-
nizations operating therein; (2) voluntary associations of all kinds;
and (3) the family, which is, after all, the original Department of
Health, Department of Education, Department of Housing, and
Department of Social Services.
There are many forms of privatization: contracting, franchising,
vouchering, leasing, selling government-owned assets to the private
sector, shedding services, withdrawing services, and deregulating to
allow the private sector to provide desired goods and services.
Contracting out common government services and selling-off
government-owned businesses has gone far beyond the conven-
tional contracting out for garbage collection and selling-off in rem
15. Aman, supra note 1, at I.B.
16. Professor Savas' discussion is based upon an essay, appearing in its entirety,
infra this volume of the Fordham Urban Law Journal. E.S. Savas, Privatization and
the New Public Management, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1731 (2001).
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properties. Let me give some of the more unusual examples that
have been occurring, which give some depth and sense to what is
going on.
Once upon a time, the United States Coast Guard used to pro-
vide assistance to foundering pleasure craft. 17 If you owned a yacht
and you ran out of gas in Long Island Sound, the Coast Guard
would come along and tow you away. It does not do that anymore.
You have to hire a private firm to do that; just as when your car
breaks down on the highway you do not call the New York State
Department of Transportation, you call the American Automobile
Association ("AAA"). Other organizations now provide precisely
that kind of assistance for boats and the Coast Guard no longer
does that business. In case of a serious problem such as fire or
sinking, the Coast Guard will, of course, bail you out.
Another example is the privatized approaches that are protect-
ing the environment. Private environmental entrepreneurs are us-
ing market forces to buy and retire fishing rights to North Atlantic
salmon. 18
A third example is private groups that are saving open space. 19
In the last ten years, 1200 local land trusts permanently protected
2.7 million new acres from development. In other words, one does
not need the President of the United States to prohibit building
roads in national forests to protect the environment; this is an addi-
tional way that can be, and is being, used.
And finally, a market-based approach, namely international
emissions trading, is called for in the Kyoto Protocol to reduce pol-
lution that is said to contribute to global warming.2 °
More examples:
17. Joyce Wadler, Belying the Legend of the Crusty Old Salt, N.Y. TIMES, July 1,
1998, at B2.
18. Orri Vigfusson, How Markets Save Salmon, PERC REP., Sept. 1998.
19. James Brooke, Land Trusts Multiplying, Study Shows, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1,
1998, at A20.
20. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol] John H.
Cushman Jr., Washington Skirmishes Over Treaty on Warming, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11,
1998, at All. See Brendan P. McGivern, Introductory Note, Conference of the Parties
to the Framework Convention on Climate Change: Kyoto Protocol, 37 I.L.M. 22
(1998) (containing Kyoto Protocol and introductory remarks). The Kyoto Protocol is
commonly referred to as the Kyoto Agreement.
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* New York State turned over Stewart and Niagara Falls Airports
to British and Spanish airport operators, respectively, on
ninety-nine-year leases.2 '
" The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey is negotiating
to lease out the World Trade Center for ninety-nine years, ex-
pecting to take in at least $3 billion.22
* Churches in Indianapolis maintain neighborhood parks under
city contracts. 23 Steve Goldsmith was the Mayor of Indianapo-
lis who pioneered this, and now, just this week, President Bush
appointed him Director of the Corporation for National
Service.24
* In the middle of Manhattan, six-acre Bryant Park was trans-
formed by a voluntary local business association from a crime-
ridden haven for junkies to a magnificent urban jewel.2
" Riverside County, California, contracts with a private company
to manage its twenty-five-branch library system. 26
" The City of Richmond, Virginia, contracts with a company to
manage its entire on-street parking program, that is, parking
meters and parking enforcement.2 7
" American embassies abroad are guarded only in part by United
States Marines. Most of the guard work is being done by local
private guard services under contract to the State
Department.28
* A foreign example: The St. Lawrence Seaway, owned by the
Canadian government, is now being managed by a private
group comprised of the major users of the Seaway, who hope to
restore the Seaway's fortunes by making it more competitive
21. Kevin Collison & Andrew Z. Galarneau, International Airport's New Lease on
Life, BUFF. NEWS, Jan. 30, 2001, at B1; Tom Incantalupo, Another Way Out of Here:
Stewart Airport May Emerge as Alternative, NEWSDAY, Dec. 19, 2000, at A28.
22. Lois Weiss, Lines Drawn in Bid War for WTC Lease, N.Y. POST, Feb. 1, 2001,
at 31.
23. Lisa Snell, Reason Pub. Pol'y Inst., Indianapolis Parks Bloom Under Church
Management, PRIVATIZATION WATCH, Oct. 1998.
24. Bush on the Creation of a White House Office Tied to Religion, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 30, 2001, at A18.
25. Tony Walker, Private Sector Revitalises New York's Mean Streets, FIN. TIMES,
July 1, 1998, at 8.
26. Robert Hanley and Steve Strunsky, Jersey City Weighs Private Management of
Libraries, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1998, at B1.
27. Central Parking Corporation Awarded Contract to Manage On-Street Parking
in Richmond; Contract Highlights Continued Growth in Privatization of Municipal
Parking Programs, BUSINESS WIRE, July 13, 1998.
28. The Wackenhut Corporation Wins Contract for Embassy Security, PR NEW-
SWIRE, Oct. 15, 1998.
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with other forms of transportation.2 9 On the other hand, the
United States government continues to own the corporation
that operates and maintains that part of the St. Lawrence Sea-
way that is in U.S. waters.
Here is a final striking example from Britain: the Blair Admin-
istration is looking into privatizing the Queen's airline, which is
equivalent to Air Force One." It is the Royal Air Force squad-
ron that transports the Royal Family and British VIPs around
the world.
These are some rather dramatic instances and examples of the
spread and growth of privatization, and it presents a challenge to
governments: how to regulate newly privatized entities.
"New Public Management"31 is the label being applied to a set of
innovative reforms, one of the defining features of which is the in-
fusion of market principles into the world of government. Privatiz-
ing, itself, is one of the elements of the New Public Management.
Reverting to core functions and getting government out of activi-
ties that are not its natural area are other elements of the New
Public Management, as are deregulating and liberalizing the econ-
omy and utilizing economic market models such as public choice,
negotiated contracts, transaction costs, and principal-agent theory
for political and administrative relationships.
Other elements of the New Public Management are emphasizing
competition, performance-based contracting, service delivery, cus-
tomer satisfaction, market incentives, and restoring civil society. A
major feature of President Bush's Inaugural Address was the crea-
tion of the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community
Initiatives.32
29. The Seaway Goes Private- Ottawa Gives Up Management, THE TORONTO
STAR, Oct. 1, 1998, at E2.
30. Queen's Flight to Bring in Private Industry, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Nov. 15,
1998.
31. Savas, supra note 16.
32. Press Release, The White House, Remarks by the President in Announcement
of the Faith-Based Initiative http://www.whitehouse.gov-/news/releases/20010129-
5.html (Jan. 29, 2001); Press Release, The White House, Executive Order, Establish-
ment of White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, http://
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/20010129-2.html; The White House, Executive
Order, Agency Responsibilities With Respect to Faith-Based and Community Initia-
tives, 2001 WL 75853, Jan. 29, 2001 (containing text of executive order #13198, estab-
lishing agency responsibilities with respect to Faith Based and Community Initiatives);
The White House, Executive Order, Establishment of White House Office of Faith-
Based and Community Initiatives, 2001 WL 75854, Jan. 29, 2001 (containing text of
executive order #13199, establishing White House Office of Faith-Based and Commu-
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Government's changing role and requirements now pose a chal-
lenge. With respect to contracting, for example, the changing role
of government means that the government is no longer a producer
of services, but rather an articulator of demand, determining how
often a particular city street should be swept: once a month, once a
week, once a day, twice a day? Government should be figuring out
what the demand should be, articulating the demand, and then
contracting, for example, to satisfy that demand, doing it either in-
house or outside, via a vendor.
In short, government becomes an articulator of demand, a pur-
chaser of services, a monitor of performance, and a regulator of
markets. There are not new functions, they are merely expanded
under New Public Management.
Thus, public managers and decision-makers are facing complex
choices: Which public services and functions should be kept in the
private sector and which ones should be privatized? How to carry
out the privatization, that is, which of the many different forms are
to be used? How to elicit the participation of the private sector in
ways that protect the public interest while allowing businesses to
earn a reasonable return on their investments? What kind of su-
pervision to exercise over the private sector?
Government must be restructured so that, instead of delivering
services, it can authorize, partially finance, oversee, and assure ac-
cess to many types of services and infrastructure. Public and pri-
vate-sector managers both will have to gain a better understanding
of that changing role of government. They will have to find effec-
tive ways to forge public/private partnerships that can provide ser-
vices and infrastructure for which neither sector alone has
sufficient resources or talent. They must develop the capacity to
manage contractual relationships and public/private partnerships.
As functions shift from state enterprises and public agencies to the
private sector, governments are responsible for crafting and enforc-
ing cost-effective regulations that protect the collective welfare, en-
sure open competition, and take advantage of market discipline,
without imposing unrealistic costs, constraining businesses unnec-
essarily, or sabotaging the attainment of goals.
Public officials and public employees must be trained in negotia-
tion and interaction, in effective regulation, and in how markets
and private companies operate. They are responsible for oversee-
ing those privatized enterprises that are natural monopolies or that
nity Initiatives); see also Andrew Miga, Bush Boosts Faith Based Charities, BOSTON
HERALD, Jan. 30, 2001, at 6.
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provide services that directly affect the social and economic well-
being of citizens. They should not do what California did with en-
ergy deregulation.33
Finally, they must play an essential role in mitigating any tempo-
rary negative impacts of the transition to a more market-based
system.
Privatization, when properly carried out, works well and pro-
duces proven benefits. However, it requires a different role for
government. It calls for more brain cells and fewer muscle cells in
the public service, more steering and less rowing.
Thank you.
MS. METZGER: Thank you, Professor Savas.
Professor Sclar?
PROFESSOR SCLAR: In the 1960s, at the height of the first
wave of James Bond mania, there was a TV show called The Man
from U.N.C.L.E.34 U.N.C.L.E.'s cause was assumed to be noble
and good, and its agents were basically the good guys. On the
other side, there was an organization called T.H.R.U.S.H. that did
evil deeds. Every week, the agents of U.N.C.L.E. would foil the
plots of world domination hatched by the minions of T.H.R.U.S.H.
and wait for another episode.
So, with little more than the power of inference, it seems to me,
this battle also is taking place on the debate over privatization. In
this arena, things that are "private," like U.N.C.L.E., are good, and
things that are called "public," like T.H.R.U.S.H., are bad.
Let me stress I am not exaggerating when I say this. In my trav-
els around the country, people frequently approach me with some
variation on the following tale: "Our state/town/county/village re-
cently privatized service X. Nobody questioned it at the time. We
just assumed that private would be better or less expensive. Then,
Y occurred and we realized that privatization was a mistake, but
now it is too late." And then, of course, to make me feel good, they
say, "And I am really sorry we didn't read your book sooner. ''35
But now, whenever privatization fails, proponents of the cause
claim that it was just not done correctly in the situation at hand.
Thus, as we watch the lights go off in California, we are informed
that the problem is that, unlike Colonel Sanders who does chicken
33. Peter Behr & William Booth, Hot, Dark Summer Ahead for California;
Drought Worsens Power Crunch, Senators Told, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 2001, at El.
34. The Man From U.N.C.L.E. (NBC television broadcast 1964-1968).
35. ELLIOT SCLAR, You DON'T ALWAYS GET WHAT You PAY FOR: THE Eco-
NOMICS OF PRIVATIZATION (2000).
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right, California did deregulation wrong.36 Maybe yes, maybe no.
The sages then go on to explain that the problem is that demand
exceeds supply. They never, of course, explain why it is that de-
mand is the same this year as last year and so is supply, yet there is
now a crisis.37
Explaining the California energy privatization debacle is not my
main point for today, but it does serve to illustrate how this policy
debate, by inference, proceeds. It is based on the strongly held
conventional wisdom that private is good and public is bad, and, if
private fails, it is merely because the forces of good simply were
not well served in this particular instance.
I am a social scientist and an economist by training, and, as such,
I am forced to note that if a policy approach fails as often as priva-
tization has, it is not just a matter of idiosyncratic failure. When
something happens that often, we have to look for systematic
trends behind the problem.
The intellectual problem is that a lot of the failure rests upon two
logically powerful and interconnected ideas that actually explain
nothing about the world as it exists. The first is the concept of
idealized competitive markets-the standard market model that
explains that if left to its own devices, competition creates output
efficiently and creates what consumers want. Of course, there are
a number of very heroic assumptions that one has to accept with
that.
The second notion comes from the field and crosses from eco-
nomics into political science. It is called public choice, or rational
choice. It starts with the assumption that public employees are es-
sentially materialistic bureaucrats who are seeking to enlarge their
domains at the expense of taxpayers and service users and con-
cludes that reform is impossible.38
The problem is that neither the idealized market nor public
choice theories provide a kernel of truth. Everybody has stood on
a line at a motor vehicle office and torn his or her hair out. Cer-
tainly, it is true that markets do many good things for us. But al-
though markets are very good servants, they are terrible masters,
and that is where some of the problems exist.
36. Behr & Booth, supra note 31. But see CONSUMER'S RES. MAG., Feb. 1, 2000
Adrian T. Moore & Lynne Kiesling, Why California's Power 'Experiment' Failed, (ar-
guing that California's actions were more akin to restructuring than deregulating).
37. But cf. Moore & Kiesling, supra, note 36 (arguing that demand for electricity
grew and supply remained stable causing the crisis in California).
38. Edward L. Rubin, Getting Past Democracy, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 711, 740-47
(2001).
1330
SYMPOSIUM
If this were just TV and another week's adventure with the men
from U.N.C.L.E., then this lazy conventional wisdom approach to
public reform would not matter. However, as we are learning to
see by the dimming lights of California, the reality is that we are
going to need more, not less, active government in service delivery
if we are going to solve problems.
Government service in the future is likely to contain more use of
contracts, public/private partnerships, innovative labor/manage-
ment work arrangements, and marketized alternative schemes.
The challenge is to make this work in the public interest, not the
private interest. In order to do that, we will need to get beyond the
simplistic debate over privatization and begin to envision govern-
ment as it really works, and not as a straw man for political
reaction.
On the other hand, we need not idealize it as a bulwark against
private greed. We need to take it on its own terms, warts and all,
and fix the problems in a much less grand, but much more effec-
tive, manner. By the same token, we need not idealize the private
partners of government as paradigms of idealized competition. We
need to see contractors with all their bumps and pimples, too.
So it seems to me the place to start is to understand the charac-
teristics of public service that are pertinent; basically, kind of an
economic understanding of the effectiveness of these new arrange-
ments. There are four characteristics I want to stress.
1. Public service is labor-intensive. The problem with princi-
ples is that there are always exceptions to them. But, by and
large, most of the public services we are talking about are
very labor-intensive.
2. Government services always involve contracting. Roughly
half of all government money is spent via contract. This has
not changed as far back as I can trace it.
3. The work is very fluid. That contracting always has ex-
isted.39 Government has put contracts out; government has
taken work back in. These decisions move on their own.
4. Information technology is changing the nature of what we
mean by organizations. This opens up a lot of new possibili-
ties to us in terms of what we can do.
In light of these characteristics, there are three alternatives I
want to put forward that I think we have to deal with when we talk
about reform. The title of my talk is "After the Ball is Over: Re-
39. Moshe Adler, Been There, Done That: The Privatization of Street Cleaning in
Nineteenth Century New York, 4 NEW LAB. F. 88-99 (1999).
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thinking the Shape of Government in the Post-Privatization Era,"
because I do not think that we can dwell on the debate a lot longer.
The first has to do with contracting. There is a very well-devel-
oped literature on the economics of contracting."n If you break
contracts out, complete contracts are simple to talk about. If you
are going to hire somebody to paint your house, you specify the
paint color, you can specify the manufacturer, you can talk about
how many coats you want. It is a finite job; it is a deliverable prod-
uct. But I still would advise you not to take your vacation the week
that the painters come. There is still some supervision that you are
going to have to do. But basically the product is clear; the points of
law are settled; if there is a dispute, it can be a dispute over the
facts, it could be taken before a judge; there are ways to enforce
the contract; and the transactions costs are relatively low.
The other kind of contracts, the kinds that we often get into with
privatization, are what are called incomplete contracts. They are
contracts in which we are talking about activities that are going to
take place over some very long period into the future in which
there are a lot of indeterminate variables that come in. Concep-
tually, one could try to draft a contract that takes everything into
account, but that would tie everything up into knots, and the reality
is you are not going to know what the problems are until they
unfold.
One way out of this, obviously, is what the economist Oliver Wil-
liamson calls third-party governance: we agree on how we are go-
ing to solve disagreements with arbitration, with mediation, with
something of that sort.4' But when you have incomplete con-
tracting you do it for items that are not easy. Easy cases would be
either the wall has been painted or the wall has not been painted;
the grass has been cut or the grass has not been cut. You look to
see if the child has been educated or the patient has been well
served. When you get to things that are not easy to do, you end up
with a lot of transactions costs and administrative costs, and there
is not necessarily an inherent advantage of one over the other.
When we talk about steering versus rowing, for example, which
is one way that we often talk about this, the problem is that, when
40. See generally Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Govern-
ance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233 (1979) (developing a good general
scheme); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS: MERGERS, CON-
TRACTING AND STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR 134, 160 (1987) (discussing vertical
integration).
41. Williamson, supra note 40, at 233, 237.
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you are in a rowboat, you are doing both. So it seems to me that
sometimes the analogies do not quite help. Sometimes, when the
work is complex, you have to both administer and do the work at
the same time.
The next thing we could talk about is networked organizations,
which are a much more interesting way to go at outsourcing. If
public/private partnerships become a form of that, we can talk
about ways in which two organizations relate to each other. They
are not necessarily disciplined by the market; they are disciplined
by their relationship to one another.
My final point is there is also the issue of labor/management co-
operation and restructuring public-sector work. There are a lot of
examples of that working; Indianapolis is talked about a lot. One of
the best stories there is how the municipal vehicle maintenance ser-
vice in Indianapolis restructured their work through labor and
management. These stories exist all over the country. I've got a
collection of them, but we will leave them for another time.
Thank you.
MS. METZGER: Professor Salamon?
PROFESSOR SALAMON: I am going to broaden our lens a bit,
and suggest that privatization is really a euphemism, as I think
some previous speakers have indicated. What we need to do,
therefore, is get beyond this euphemism and begin to be more con-
crete and specific about what really is going on. To do so, we need
to put the privatization discussion into a bigger framework. That is
really what I want to do, drawing on a chapter in a book I have
prepared for Oxford University Press.42
The central point of this book is that a fundamental change has
taken place over the past half century in the whole character of the
public sector, a change that involves much more than an expansion
in the scope and scale of government, that involves as well a funda-
mental change in its basic forms.
The picture of the public sector that most of us carry around in
our heads, and that is still the straw man against which the priva-
tization advocates and the reinventing-government advocates ha-
rangue, the image of the government bureaucrat delivering a
42. Professor Salamon's discussion is based upon an article, appearing in its en-
tirety, infra this volume of the Fordham Urban Law Journal. Lester M. Salamon, The
New Governance and The Tools of Public Action: An Introduction, 28 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1611 (2001). A version of the article will be published in THE TOOLS OF
GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEW GOVERNANCE (Lester M. Salamon ed., forth-
coming 2001).
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service, turns out not to be a very accurate depiction of most of
what government does today and has not been for quite a long
time.
We have been in the midst of what I refer to as "a revolution in
the technology of public action" that I think goes well beyond
privatization and for which "privatization" is, I think, a somewhat
inaccurate, or at least inadequate, term. The heart of this techno-
logical revolution is a massive proliferation of tools of public ac-
tion, the emergence and application over the past fifty years of a
whole variety of new instruments for solving public problems.
There is "direct government," of course, but this is just one of
the tools of public action. It turns out that we have a whole variety
of other tools as well, some of which Professor Savas indicated. 3
These include contracts, grants, direct loans, loan guarantees, eco-
nomic regulation, social regulation, insurance, corrective fees-to
name just a handful.
Each one of these tools has its own operating characteristics, its
own skill requirements, its own delivery system, almost its own po-
litical economy. Terms like "privatization" are really too crude to
capture the subtle and important differences that exist among these
approaches. Each tool has its own actors and engages its own set
of players, with its own standard operating procedures and skills.
Each one has its own tasks associated with it. As a consequence,
this gives certain advantages to different players in the process.
Choices among these tools are not wholly neutral choices.
Rather, they have profound consequences for how the public sec-
tor operates and how we go about doing various collective things.
In addition, many of the tools that are increasingly being used have
a very important common characteristic: they are increasingly indi-
rect; they rely on a variety of other institutions to have their effect.
It is not simply private-sector institutions that they are using; they
are using a whole variety of types of institutions.
We have built a system that I have referred to as "third-party
government," in which the public sector is extensively using a
whole host of third-party agents to carry out public purposes.44
This third-party government phenomenon is distinctive because it
involves the sharing of the discretionary authority of government
with a host of third-party actors: nonprofit organizations, for-profit
corporations, and other levels of government. This makes it of par-
43. See Remarks of E.S. Savas, supra this Panel Discussion.
44. Salamon, supra note 42, at Introduction.
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ticular concern to the legal profession, which is concerned about
the control of discretionary authority.
This has been possible because we have, in a sense, decon-
structed public action, as Professor Savas indicated.45 We have
taken what used to be thought of as a single whole-a government
program-and broken it into its constituent parts. So, for example,
we distinguish now between the financing and the delivery of pub-
lic services, and acknowledge the fact that these can be handled by
different entities, as shown in Table 1. Thus, both finance and de-
livery can be public or private, and public delivery in turn can be
broken down between the national government and state and local
governments. Similarly, private delivery can be broken down be-
tween nonprofit and for-profit. You begin to see the options that
are available for structuring the provision of public services, which
is, of course, just one of the functions that the public sector is en-
gaged in.
TABLE 1: PATTERNS OF PUBLIC PROBLEM-SOLVING
DELIVERY FINANCE
Public Private
Public
(1) National A B
(2) State/local
Private
(1) Nonprofit C D
(2) For-profit
The result is a whole variety of options. Cell A in Table 1 is
probably the one that most Americans have in mind: it features
public finance and public delivery. This is the classic system. But it
is not the only way that we can structure things. We can have Cell
C, which involves public finance and private delivery, using con-
tracts or grants or any of the other vehicles that are available. Or
we can rely on private finance and public delivery-Cell B-which
is the system that Professor Savas was referring to with the Coast
Guard charging for some of the services that it used to provide for
free. Finally, the public sector can encourage private finance of
private services-Cell D-as it does with tax credits for the private
purchase of private day care.
So we have deconstructed the doing of public business in very
significant ways. The scope of what has transpired is really ex-
45. See Remarks of E.S. Savas, supra this Panel Discussion.
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traordinary. It turns out that if we look at the federal government,
the amount of money that goes out through the classic, stereotyped
image of how the public service operates is a very, very small share
of total government activity. For example, although we have a $1.8
trillion federal budget,4 6 I would argue that the true value of fed-
eral activity today is more in the nature of $3.6 trillion, or twice as
large, when you include all of the things the federal government is
doing and put a value on them (see Table 2). 47 Of that $3.6 trillion,
only about $187 billion, or five percent, takes the form of the direct
provision of goods and services by government, as shown in Table
2.48
Even if we include questionable items in the direct category,
such as direct income supports, Social Security, interest on the na-
tional debt, and direct loans, we are still talking about only approx-
imately $1 trillion of federal activity, or twenty-eight percent of the
total.49
Beyond that, there is a whole variety of other activity that I
would put into the indirect category. As shown in Table 2, this
includes about $200 billion of contracting, $286 billion in grants,
and $251 billion in vouchers. All of these are "on budget." In ad-
dition, however, there are tax expenditures of $602 billion; loan
guarantee commitments of $252 billion in fiscal year 1999 alone;
insurance, if we include only net additions to deposit insurance and
forget pension insurance and disaster insurance, of $376.1 billion50 ;
and regulation that imposes costs elsewhere in the economy that is
estimated at about $200 billion.5'
46. U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES Gov-
ERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2001, at 2 (2000) [hereinafter 2001 BUDGET].
47. See Salamon, supra note 42, at tbl.3. The table appears as "Table 2" in this
transcript, but is "Table 3" in the article. Sources for the table include: Data on gov-
ernment contracting from GEN. SERVS. ADMIN., FEDERAL PROCUREMENT DATA SYS-
TEM, FEDERAL CONTRACT ACTIONS AND DOLLARS, FY 1999 available at http://
www.fpds.gsa.gov/fpds/fpr/sfcomp.htm. Data on regulations from U.S. OFFICE OF
MGMT & BUDGET, COSTS AND BENEFITS OF REGULATION 2000, available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/2000fedreg-charts.pdf. Data on tax expendi-tures,
grants, loan guarantees, government-sponsored enterprises from U.S. OFFICE OF
MGMT & BUDGET, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2001, at 109-11,184-85, 204, 230-37, 246 (1999). Data on
deposit insurance is available from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/statistical/statistics. All other data from: 2001
BUDGET, supra note 46.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See FED. DEP. INS. CORP., FDIC 1999 ANNUAL REPORT: PROMISES KEPT
(2000), at http://www.fdic.gov/about/strategic/report/99AnnualReport/index.html.
51. Supra note 47.
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TABLE 2: SCALE OF U.S. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ACTIVITY,
TOOL OF PUBLIC ACTION, FY 1999
Amt ($ bns) %
Direct Government Goods and Services 186.8 5.2%
Income support 550.4 15.4%
Interest 229.7 6.4%
Direct loans (Obligations) 38.4 1.1%
Subtotal, Direct 1005.3 28.1%
Indirect Government
Contracting 198.8 5.6%
Grants 286.4 8.0%
Vouchers 251.0 7.0%
Tax expenditures 602.0 16.8%
Loan guarantees (Commitments) 252.4 7.0%
Govt-sponsored enterprises (Loans) 409.2 11.4%
Insurance (Deposit insurance) 376.1 10.5%
Regulation 200.0 5.6%
Subtotal, Indirect 2575.9 71.9%
GRAND TOTAL 3581.2 100.0%
Budget outlays 1703.1 47.6%
Other activity 1878.1 52.4%
This yields total indirect activity of close to $2.6 trillion, com-
pared to the direct activity of $1 trillion.52 We are therefore talking
about a government that operates in a very different way than I
think most of us understand, than most of the traditional public
administration texts suggest, and than most of the "reinventing
government" and "New Public Management" theories suggest. Far
from being a change to be promoted, the outsourcing of public
functions turns out already to be a very significant part of how gov-
ernment operates.
All of this has profound implications. For one thing, there are
immense management challenges that flow from this way of or-
ganizing the public sector. The public management problem has
leapt beyond the borders of the public agency. It now suffuses sig-
nificant portions of the entire society. We are operating our pro-
grams through incredibly complicated chains of indirection, and we
know from much of the recent management theory that it is ex-
tremely challenging to manage such indirect action.
52. Id.
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TABLE 3: IMPLICATIONS
* Management challenge
* Accountability challenge
* Legitimacy challenge
For example, we have a whole body of theory, called principal-
agent theory, which tells us that in these circumstances it is not the
principal, but the agent, who ends up with most of the influence
because the agent has more knowledge of what is going on on the
ground.53 The paradox that results is that contrary to the popular
aphorism that "she who pays the piper calls the tune," in this new
world of indirection, it is actually the piper who is in control.
This, in turn, raises fundamental accountability challenges. How
do we hold these agents accountable? We frequently do not even
know what they are doing, which is why we get into the problems
Professor Sclar alluded to.54
Third-party government also raises very significant legitimacy
challenges. Thanks to these new forms of public action, the public
often does not understand what is going on in its name. What is
more, the connection between the taxes people pay and the ser-
vices they receive becomes confused when the services reach them
through some private for-profit or nonprofit agency. This discon-
nection is fundamentally threatening to the legitimacy of public
action.
To correct these problems, we need a new way of thinking-a
new paradigm-that goes well beyond the simple aphorism of
privatization and really begins to come to terms with the far more
complex reality that we are living with. I propose the "New Gov-
ernance" as the name for this new paradigm. I use this term to
stress the two central features of this approach.
The first, signified by use of the term "Governance," suggests
that what we are talking about is not government as a set of institu-
tions, but a collaborative process of collective problem-solving in-
volving partnership and interdependence as its central core.
The second, signified by the word "New," stresses that we now
have to approach these collaborative processes in a new way that
53. See John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Principals and Agents: An Over-
view, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 1-3 (John W. Pratt
& Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985) (explaining that agents often "know more about
their tasks than their principals do").
54. See Remarks of Elliott D. Sclar, supra this Panel Discussion.
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takes serious account of their significant challenges, something that
the new public administration and the advocates of privatization
have not done sufficiently.
What does this paradigm consist of? Fundamentally, it has five
key features,"9 and I will try to run through a few. First, as shown
in Table 4, it involves a very fundamental shift in the unit of analy-
sis in policy work. Both the traditional, and the new, public admin-
istration tend to focus on the agency or the individual program as
the unit of analysis. The "New Governance" shifts the focus dra-
matically to "the tool of public action," the distinctive instruments
that are used. It calls for us to get serious about understanding the
differences among these tools of public action, and begin to look
much more closely at them, instead of just lumping them in a big
pot called privatization.
TABLE 4: THE "NEw GOVERNANCE" PARADIGM
Classical Public Administration "New Governance"
Program/agency Tool
Hierarchy Network
Public vs. private Public & private
Command and control Negotiation and persuasion
Management skills Enablement skills
A tool of public action is an identifiable method through which
collective action is structured to address public problems. But
tools are really bundles of attributes. As shown in Table 5, they
involve a good or an activity, a delivery vehicle (e.g., a loan or a
grant), a delivery system, and a set of rules. So when you choose a
tool, you also choose a delivery vehicle, and a delivery system.
You may choose the commercial banking system, for example, if
your delivery vehicle is a loan guarantee.
TABLE 5: TOOLS AS BUNDLES OF ATTRIBUTES
" Good or activity
" Delivery vehicle
" Delivery system
* Rules and procedures
55. Salamon, supra note 42.
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Reflecting this, tools have various dimensions to them. They are
not simply public or private. They vary in their degree of coercive-
ness, directness, visibility, and automaticity (see Table 6).
TABLE 6: DIMENSIONS OF TOOLS
• Coerciveness
• Directness
" Visibility
" Automaticity
These, in turn, are associated with different effects. The differ-
ent choices among these different dimensions thus have conse-
quences. An automatic tool may be more efficient, but it may not
be more effective, and it may not yield greater equity. Therefore,
we have to balance the choices of these tools against these various
criteria.
Let me very quickly comment on a few of the other key features
of this New Governance paradigm.
As Table 4 shows, the New Governance also involves a shift
from a focus on hierarchy, which is the focus both of traditional
public administration and of the new public administration, to
much more serious attention to the public/private networks that
many of the newer tools engage. This, in turn, requires an under-
standing of network management. And it turns out that network
management is not as simple as some of the new public administra-
tion literature seems to assume. We know from other bodies of
theory, such as principal-agent theory and network theory, that
these are extremely complicated mechanisms to manage.
The New Governance also involves a shift from thinking of the
public sector and the private sector in opposition to each other, as
is common both in the traditional public administration and some
of the privatization theories, to seeing the two as partners in public
service.
Similarly, the New Governance requires us to shift from seeing
command and control as the central features of administrative be-
havior, to an emphasis on negotiation and persuasion as the central
elements in administrative action.
Finally, the New Governance calls for a shift from management
skills on the part of public servants to enablement skills, the skills
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of activating, orchestrating, and modulating these complicated rela-
tionships and networks.
All of this requires a whole new body of knowledge that we have
to develop, teach, and introduce into both legal and administrative
courses. First, as shown in Table 7, we must develop a systematic
body of knowledge about these different tools so that students un-
derstand what it means to operate a contracting program and how
that differs from running an economic regulation program, and
how that, in turn, differs from social regulation. Second, we must
perfect our design knowledge, so that we can make better decisions
about which tool is appropriate in which circumstance. Finally, we
have to improve our operational knowledge-our knowledge of
how to run these different types of programs given their peculiar
characteristics
TABLE 7: NEEDED: NEW KNOWLEDGE
" Tool knowledge
" Design knowledge
" Operational knowledge
All of this will require a fundamental rethinking of a lot of our
training both in the public sector and in the nearby private sector
so that people can come to understand the demands of this world
of new governance.
Thank you.
MS. METZGER: Professor Sabel?
PROFESSOR SABEL: Good morning.
I will continue our progression, but first, let me just review the
story as I have understood it so far.
The first version of things is that we have a progression; we have
a movement from the public to the private, in which public and
private are understood in familiar ways. "Public" is a bureaucracy
providing a service accountable to a legislature and, thereby, indi-
rectly accountable to the electorate. "Private" is a group of private
agents communicating with each other largely through price signals
or contracts with specified goals, which are themselves translatable
into price signals.
The claim is that these are well-known entities; there is a move-
ment from one province, public, to the other, private. The question
is how should government respond at the second order? If the
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first-order activity is abandoning its traditional activities to the pri-
vate sector, then what should its response be to reordering the pri-
vate orderers that are now doing what the government used to do?
We have deconstructed somehow both the actors, public and pri-
vate, and the very notion of a public/private boundary, given that
there are no longer such things as distinct public/private actors in
any intelligible sense. We should examine the new tools that have
emerged to solve problems, and, somehow or other, a deeper un-
derstanding of those tools will allow us to do something, better
prosecute the goals of public action in some way. In that view, it is
not a question of governing a new structure, it is a question of
learning to govern where there are no fixed structures, where there
are only tools themselves and their application under discussion.
I want to propose a third version of what is going on. In order to
do this, given the time constraints, I want to use an example: what
is going on conspicuously in education. A year and a half ago, edu-
cation looked like it was a good example of the debates that attend
the first view of things-the movement from the public to the pri-
vate. People who believe in public education traditionally believed
it was necessarily public because it involved the formation of young
citizens in a way that had to be subtracted from the logic of profit-
making providers. Furthermore, efficiency and accountability re-
quire that education be provided in some bureaucratized form
where people could oversee teachers, thereby ensuring that the
people got what they were promised.
On the other side are the people who embrace the public choice
view. This group believes that precisely because of the democratic
accountability structure and the bureaucratic organization required
to assure accountability, education has to be privatized because it is
unreformable. It is unreformable because the combination of leg-
islative oversight and the de facto bureaucratic monopoly means
that entrenched interests-the teachers' unions, the janitors, the
friends of the local school board-entrench themselves partially,
and then the people who manage oust them and partially entrench
their own favorite ideas. The result is either a concerted grab by
some group that sits unmolested for decades, or total chaos as dif-
ferent contending groups impose fragmentary solutions. The pub-
lic choice perspective is: privatize it or it cannot be improved.
Neither of these things has happened. We simply have not
stayed with the public structure, let alone expanded it in the old
way; nor is there a substantial movement toward anything that
looks like real privatization, as you can see from the very limited
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diffusion of vouchers, and their defeat in several referenda, and
many other indicators.56
The real reason is not that the debate is stalemated, but rather
that in the interim, while people were fussing about those things,
an alternative emerged in the last decade or fifteen years in states
like Kentucky, Texas, and North Carolina.57 It is now a massive
movement and you see a huge amount of what I am about to de-
scribe in California; it is arriving piecemeal even in the backwater
of New York.58 If it is here, too, with respect to education, you
know it has taken hold pretty much all over the country.
This alternative is a transfer of decision-making between the cen-
tral unit of government, typically a state or a district, and individual
schools; but the solution scales. The central unit gives the lower-
level unit, for example, the school or the school district, the auton-
omy to address by its own means problems that come to light. It
gives them the resources to reorganize the school in return for re-
porting rich information about performance and improvement.
So this implies that there are standards, and somebody initially
sets them, for example, at the state level.59 Those standards pro-
vide that students have to be progressing and attaining certain
levels, and if they do, everything is okay, and if they are not, there
is a problem. There is testing, there are results, and then several
things happen.60
56. See Maureen Downey, Vouchers Movement Repudiated: Constitution Editorial
Board Mambers Offer Their Interpretation on Votes Around the Country, ATLANTA
CONST., Nov. 9, 2000, at A27.
57. See Molly Hunter, All Eyes Forward: Public Engagement and Educational Re-
form in Kentucky, 485 J.L. & EDuc. 498 (1999) (detailing the Kentucky Education
Reform Act of 1990, 1990 Ky. Acts 476. See generally William E. Thro, The Third
Wave: The Impact of the Montana, Kentucky, and Texas Decisions on Public School
Finance Reform Litigation, 19 J.L. & EDuc. 219 (1990); Symposium: Investing in Our
Children's Future: School Finance Reform in the '90s, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 379
(1991) (examining and detailing Texas' education reforms, throughout the 1980s and
1990s); N.C. GEN. STAT. §115C-238.29A (1999) (outlining the purpose for charter
schools in North Carolina); Andrew Broy, Comment, Charter Schools and Education
Reform: How State Constitutional Challenges Will Alter Charter School Legislation, 79
N.C.L.R. 493, 516-28 (2001) (analyzing North Carolina's chartering process and other
education reform programs); CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM, STATE By STATE CHARTER
LAW PROFILES (listing states with charter school enabling acts, including North Caro-
lina and Texas), at http://www.edreform.com/charterschools/laws/.
58. See Lynn Olson, Redefining 'Public' Schools, EDUC. WEEK, Apr. 26, 2000, at 1,
24, 25, 27 (mentioning California and New York as two states that are experimenting
with Charter schools as an alternative to vouchers).
59. Kentucky, for example, passed the Kentucky Education Reform Act of 1990,
1990 Ky. Acts 476. See Molly A. Hunter, All Eyes Forward: Public Engagement &
Educational Reform in Kentucky, 485 J.L. & EDUc. 498 (1999).
60. Hunter, supra note 59.
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Individual schools that do badly must reorganize in order to im-
prove. The standards often will be reorganized if they prove to be
defective. All of this is done in the good cases with extreme atten-
tion to the fates and rates of improvement of subgroups that are at
risk.
This system does something that is theoretically quite anoma-
lous. It is not a hierarchy because the lower-level units have free-
dom to propose solutions and to carry them out in a way that is
simply inconsistent with any principal-agent model or any standard
notion of hierarchy. But the system is not serviced or accountable
through markets either, because lower-level agents are responsible
for responding to a framework, which is itself continuously up-
dated and rich in information. It is the opposite of a single-price
metric. The lower-level agents have to fulfill a very high-dimen-
sional set of requirements. The requirements themselves emerge
from some form of collaboration between the higher-level and the
lower-level agents.
Now, this is a unique system. I assure you that neither network
theory nor principal-agent theory will explain this. That does not
mean that it is unintelligible or that it cannot work. It just means
that it is something in the repertoire of organizational capacities
that was unanticipated by these earlier theoretical considerations
and the political debates with which they were associated.
Not at all incidentally, the structure of this education system
turns out to be the structure of private reorganization in the new
economy. This is the way modern firms are organized, and it also
explains why there is a very porous boundary between what is in-
side the firm and what is outside the firm.
The education example is not singular. There are many exam-
ples, ranging from very large changes in environmental regulation 61
to drug courts,62 in which very similar things are going on. There
are even a few where the structure is as consolidated as in educa-
tion and where, amazingly, there is a political consensus of the
depth that there is in education.
I am not claiming that all the changes you see are necessarily
going in this direction, or that everything that looks like this is this.
61. See President Bill Clinton & Vice President Al Gore, State of the Union Ad-
dress Reinventing Environmental Regulation? (1995), available at http://es.epa.gov/
program/exec/environ.html.
62. See generally Hon. Stephen L. Platt, Drug Court Experiment, 34 MD. BAR J. 44
(2001) (explaining the need for and delineating the different groups that work to-
gether to form "drug courts").
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The point is: many things that do not superficially look like the
outcome I am pointing to, are turning into it. Many things that
could be billed as it, that do look superficially like it, are not, and
there are very, very profound implications for the idea of demo-
cratic accountability when you move from a system where it is the
legislature that is exercising bureaucratic oversight to a system in
which some diffuse form of participation in the activities of the
lower-level units and the ability to review the whole system is the
form of accountability.
I leave you to your deliberations. Thank you.
MS. METZGER: Thank you, all.
One of the things I found most interesting was this question of
whether privatization is really the issue. Or should we be looking
more broadly in terms of restructuring government and some of
the issues that become involved as we do so, and start coming up
with new solutions? I would like to relate that back to the first
discussion about the levels of government at which we are seeing
some changes.
At what point is this something that requires reforming at the
local level, in particular? Can it work as well in terms of intergov-
ernmental relationships? Does this suggest to us where we should
be focusing our administrative reforms? Or is the same point
about the way that we need to reconceive the public/private divide
as applicable at whatever level?
PROFESSOR SAVAS: One of the aspects of the new public
management is devolution, and that is taking place at the federal-
to-state level. I am not sure to what extent it is happening from
state-to-local, 63 but even at the local level there is a growing em-
phasis on community and community-based organizations. Thus,
these concepts apply through the entire range of governments.
DEAN AMAN: I would agree with that. I think that the drive
for different kinds of efficiencies and competition occur through-
out all levels of government. If you look at the federal level, priva-
tizing prisons at the federal level mirrors really what is going on at
the state level.64
63. KEITH WATSON & STEVEN GOLD, THE URBAN INST., THE OTHER SIDE OF
DEVOLUTION: SHIFTING RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN STATE & LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
(1997), available at http://newfederalism.urban.org/html/other.htm.
64. See David J. DelFiandra, Comment, The Growth of Prison Privatization and
the Threat Posed by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 38 DuO. L. REV. 591 (2000); Peter J. Duitsman,
Comment, The Private Prison Experiment: A Private Sector Solution to Prison Over-
crowding, 76 N.C. L. REV. 2209 (1998).
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Each area differs substantially. There are some common bonds,
but it is like globalization where industries differ significantly. But
there is common ground and it goes through all levels of govern-
ment as well as the private sector.
PROFESSOR SCLAR: My sense is that what is emerging is this
notion that the market as the alternative to organization reform is
a moot issue. It is really not what is happening, because even after
you sign a contract, markets are out the door because you are now
in a long-term relationship. And, as Professor Salamon said, it re-
ally has to do with skills in negotiation and participation once you
are at that stage.
So the real issue, I think, and Professor Sabel begins to raise it, is
that information technology is changing the way organizations
could inter-penetrate each other, and the way people can be ac-
countable. At the same time, in the private sector there is more
use of outsourcing and also more growth.65
Banks become very consolidated and large because as they grow,
the per-unit cost of maintaining accounts goes way down so they
can afford to buy other banks, further removing per-unit cost, etc.
On the other hand, they can contract out a lot of services because
they can lower the accountability transaction costs.
We must begin by asking what the services and issues are. In-
stead of going with these preconceived notions of markets and hi-
erarchy, we must ask what we need to do to make something work,
because the public sector is a labor-intensive sector. The public
sector is a funny business; it is a business in which, if it was a pri-
vate business, your capital walks out the door every night; these are
the people who know what the work is and how it gets done. A lot
of times the question is: How do you begin to restructure and reor-
ganize that so that public sector workers can do things more
productively?
The questions and issues that interest me are: What is the less
costly way to do it? How do you get accountability and efficiency?
If we just stay at that level of moving the big pieces around the
board, we do not see these things are happening at the micro level.
So I do not see it as a state/local/federal issue; I see it much more
as restructuring organizations and information and getting respon-
siveness in these things.
PROFESSOR SALAMON: The central point is to emphasize
how difficult these instruments of operation are, and the new de-
65. Savas, supra note 16.
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mands that they are putting on all levels of government. This may
have particular implications for state and local government. They
certainly have implications for the federal government.
In general, the current instruments of operation escalate the de-
mands in terms of skill and capacity. It is not the case that the
public sector is going to be as labor-intensive in the future. I think
this is the point that Professor Savas was making, that it is the brain
cells that are increasingly being utilized in the public sector, and
this requires a very different set of skills. It is extremely difficult to
go head-to-head against some of the private contractors that you
are having to deal with increasingly and to manage these things,
given the lack of information and the difficulties of figuring out
what actually is happening.
In education, actually holding the local districts accountable in a
flow of information that is frequently imperfect, requires figuring
out how to make the public sector smart buyers, how to equip them
to manage contracts, as opposed to managing personnel who are
delivering services. Such systems are not entirely new, but the
scope and the plethora of different instruments that the public sec-
tor managers are going to have to learn is immense.
Therefore, I think the fundamental point is to emphasize the in-
creased skill demands that are being placed on state and local
governments.
PROFESSOR SABEL: On the skills, let me just make two
points: one on the question of whether the government can acquire
the new skills, at whatever level; and then, I will say something
about the levels.
It is not automatic, but the government's acquisition of new skills
is a less onerous task than you might think. The reason is that in
many of these circumstances, if you get competing proposals to
carry out a difficult task, each of the proposals is essentially a criti-
cism of the other proposals. The good proposals recommend them-
selves by telling you what is wrong with the others, and then you go
back to the other proposal makers and say, I have just learned this,
and go answer the questions raised by it, and only then do you
write the contracts.
Government can acquire this knowledge. If you are the central
agent in this operation and are looking at the proposals from vary-
ing jurisdictions, it is not at all difficult to do this, if you decide that
is what you want to do.
Now, a lot of the problem is that people actually mean they just
want to devolve decision-making and not assume any responsibility
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for it, in which case they do not get the information; they do not
carry out this kind of contractual oversight with learning. But it is
not a technical problem. You would have to introduce substantial
resources into various levels of government to accommodate this.
The actual nature of these kinds of systems is self-correction.
The other small point is this. The architectures that I am talking
about have two features. First, they scale higher and lower with
respect to each other-they can be the school district and the
school, the state and the school district, the federal government
and the state and the school district. This is true in all of these
different areas.
Sub-point one is that increasingly you do not need to have all the
levels involved in many of these programs. Sometimes it is best to
go federal/very local, and sometimes it is federal/state.
Sub-point two: one of the real problems is not that it is hard to
do this at any particular level of government, though there are
questions of sheer incompetence and corruption that have to be
addressed. We have our traditional notions of federalism, in which
the states are sovereign entities and have dignitary rights and, not
incidentally, a Supreme Court which is straddling the last part of
the nineteenth century and the remote part of this century in an
interesting way for jurisprudence, but maybe not for citizens. The
Supreme Court is very attentive to these distinctions that do not
really appear to make a difference from the point of view of these
new architectures. So that is not a trivial problem.
PROFESSOR SCLAR: Professor Salamon made the point that
the new public sector is not going to be as labor-intensive, but work
is still labor-intensive. Whether the government contracts for, or
itself does the work, there is a lot of work to do. If you are filling
potholes, you are filling potholes. The question is: Does it pay to
have a manager who manages a contract who manages another
manager who manages the worker, or does it pay to manage the
worker directly? The answer is clearly and unequivocally: "it de-
pends," and let me be firm about that.
But the point is, you have more than one way to do this work,
but it is still labor-intensive work. The question is: How is the tech-
nology changing and how can you control things? You cannot sep-
arate government managing from government doing. Sometimes
you can, but, as I said, with steering and rowing, if you are in a
canoe, you tell me when you are steering and you tell me when you
are rowing if you are sitting in the back there all by yourself.
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We've got to break out of some of these old conceptual boxes and
start thinking about this in more functional ways.
MS. METZGER: Are there questions from the audience?
QUESTION: Professor Sclar, when you were talking about the
energy crisis in California and making the general point that when
a policy fails, often you hear these explanations that "it would have
worked if we had done it this way or that way." At a certain point
you get to the conclusion-it is really the policy that is a failure,
not the implementation.
It is interesting, because I have often heard that as a criticism,
not of privatization, but of the more publicly administered systems.
The critics of public schools will say, "If the public schools in urban
settings fail over and over again, do not tell us the solution is more
money, do not tell us it is new curriculum; the fundamental system
itself has a flaw." The same criticism is made in the context of
public housing, public hospitals, etc.
So my question is: Whether it is the private side or the tradi-
tional administrative structures, how do you know that when a pol-
icy fails again in particular cases that the reason it fails is the policy
itself, rather than just that the policy was really good but if this
variable or that variable were changed it would be a good policy?
How do we know when it is the system itself that is the source of
the failure?
PROFESSOR SCLAR: I think that is a good question and I
think that is a good critique of what I said. I would agree with you
that this knife cuts both ways. The problem is I do not have a sim-
ple answer to that. The only answer I keep coming back to is to try
to get clear about what the problem is.
The other problem is that when you deal with public decision-
making, there is more than one right answer, but some right an-
swers are more beneficial for some groups and some right answers
are more beneficial for other groups. So the problem is we ulti-
mately cannot avoid the politics of that. It is a large gray area.
As an urban planner, if I said, "We are going to build a parking
lot by the beach to make the beach more accessible," the people
who live in the town say, "Well, you have now made it less accessi-
ble to us."
So really there is no easy answer to that, and you have to try and
put your values out and talk about which things you are trying to
maximize, because, as I said, both sides have warts and pimples.
PROFESSOR SAVAS: I think there is an easy answer to that:
using competition and comparisons. In the case of schooling, that
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is a particularly good approach. There are plenty of private schools
that do well; parochial schools, which accept students very much
like the public schools accept; and finally, home schooling. So
those comparisons are available. The political problem is how to
deal with those, how to take advantage of that knowledge, and, in
my opinion, how to provide that kind of choice for parents and
children.
PROFESSOR SALAMON: My point would be that we have a
real danger of a mis-specification problem, mis-specifying the cause
of the problem. In particular, if you agree with my argument,
which is that there are very few programs that take the form of
pure public activity, much of what we are criticizing and using
terms like public program to refer to, conjuring up this image of a
public bureaucracy delivering a service, turns out not to be that at
all. So, much of the critique of the 1960s' social programs, which
criticized them as too much government, fail to note that when you
strip away the rhetoric of those programs, what those programs
consisted of were grants to states. In most cases the majority of the
money was then contracted out to either a for-profit or a nonprofit
vendor, creating a very complicated system of indirection, which
then became extremely difficult to manage and to control and to
evaluate. To call that an example of a public-sector failure without
realizing what it really was is unfair.
I would argue that many of the most egregious failures attrib-
uted to public action in recent decades turn out to be failures of
indirect government, as opposed to failures of direct government.
That is certainly true at the national level.
We have a lot of examples of failed systems of indirection. I
think that the real priority we are going to live with is indirection; I
do not think that is going to change; our only solution is to make it
work better. So I think we have to be careful about mis-specifying
the cause and nature of the difficulties.
MS. METZGER: Professor Sabel?
PROFESSOR SABEL: Let me return to your very precise ques-
tion. I think it is a very good question to ask at this point.
Let me suggest there is another simple answer to it. It is not an
elegant answer, but it is a simple answer, and I actually think it is
the answer that explains why there has been change.
In fact, it is very hard to know when something is a systemic
breakdown and when it is accidental. People who are in charge of
things are not generally disposed to hit the panic button every time
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there is a problem, so the inclination is to think it is an accident and
try to fix it.
So how do you know when it tips from being accidental to sys-
temic? The way to know is when all the people in the system, the
people who deal with the problems of the system day by day, de-
cide that they cannot fix it within the confines of the existing sys-
tem. That is different from a comparison. Comparisons are easy to
conjure up and comparisons tend to be made by people outside the
system. But what really tends to let you know you have a reliable
judgment of failure is when people inside, the public school bu-
reaucracy-which is free of indirection-say to themselves, "This is
not working." The way you on the outside know they say that is
because all of a sudden you get coalitions, quite surprising coali-
tions, of very disgruntled insiders whose professional honor, whose
sense of dedication, whose sense of humanity, and whose sense of
disgust are triggered, teaming up with people on the outside to try
new things. That is the indication that the scheme is really system-
atically broken. That is an endogenous indication, if you like. It
lacks a certain objectivity, but it is coincident with real change.
You would not be having the massive change that we are having
in American public institutions if people on the inside were not
well aware of the problems.
Go back to these old books about the public choice and the log-
ics of collective action.6 6 They essentially tell you that entrenched
interests can never be dislodged because their stakes in preserving
the old system are so much larger than the outsiders' stakes in im-
proving it.67 And yet, they are being dislodged, and the reason is
that there are new forms of public action that essentially suppose
the alliance between disgruntled insiders and people on the
outside. So there is a non-empirical, but effective, indication.
PROFESSOR SAVAS: Would you illustrate that with an
example?
66. See generally Williamson, supra note 40 (discussing vertical integration);
MANCUR OLSON JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS (1965). For summaries of the public choice theory, see DANIEL
A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE (1991); DENNIS C.
MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE H (1989); Edward L. Rubin, Beyond Public Choice: Com-
prehensive Rationality in the Writing and Reading of Statutes, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1
(1991); MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC GROWTH
STAGFLATION, AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES 77-79 (1982). For a good summary of eco-
nomic analysis of interest groups following Olson, see RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE
ACTION (1982) and TODD SANDLER, COLLECTIVE ACTION: THEORIES AND APPLICA-
TIONS (1992).
67. See generally Olson, supra note 66.
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PROFESSOR SABEL: The examples are the school movements
that I referred to in Texas and Kentucky.68 In Kentucky, there is a
statewide initiative composed of people from inside the school sys-
tem, former high officials in the Kentucky Education Department
and whole communities across the state. 69 They organized a giant
campaign to pressure the Kentucky State Legislature, the Ken-
tucky Supreme Court, and the Department of Education of
Kentucky.70
In Texas it is a totally explicit alliance of the same thing. 71 The
same thing is also going on now in California and many other
places.72 It is not that it occurs sometimes; it is the absolute typical
pattern in these things. We could do it for environmentalism, too.
MS. METZGER: I would like to get one more question, if some-
one has one.
PROFESSOR SABEL: One quick point. If anyone is interested,
there is a paper I co-authored with Jim Liebman on my Web site
that has tons of detail about this topic. 73 This is not a freehand
construction.
MR. WARD: My name is Mark Ward and I am with the U.S.
General Accounting Office. I am intrigued by some of the emerg-
ing paradigms that you have discussed in terms of new governance.
Given that our middle name is accountability, and the fact that we
have looked and continue to look at privatization, what are some
of your thoughts as to how the so-called accountability or oversight
systems or organizations could be reconfigured or reorganized to
shift themselves with the emerging new governance? I am think-
ing, for example, of traditional contract auditing functions, ways of
getting public input on grievances, or other procedures or
processes that try to answer the question of accountability both
from the perspective of to whom and for what?
DEAN AMAN: Without getting too technical on this, this is why
I think that, from the administrative law point of view, this public/
68. Hunter, supra note 59.
69. Id. at 494.
70. Id. at 491.
71. William Thro, The Third Wave: The Impact of the Montana, Kentucky, and
Texas Decisions on the Future of Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 19 J.L. &
EDUC. 219 (1990).
72. Michael Rebell & Robert Hughes, Schools, Communities and the Courts: A
Dialogic Approach to Education Reform, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 99, 117 n.225
(1996).
73. CHARLES SABEL & JAMES LIEBMAN, Emerging Model of Public School Gov-
ernance and Legal Reform: Beyond Redistribution and Privatization, at http://
www.law.columbia.edu/sabel/papers.htm.
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private divide is written into the law through the state action doc-
trine and through a number of our laws that refer to state agen-
cies.74 Certain requirements apply to state agencies, but they do
not apply to private actors who are carrying out similar tasks. So at
a minimum, freedom of information acts, both at the federal and at
the state level, are geared to just public agencies but not to the
private side.
Secondly, the federal Administrative Procedures Act,75 which is
mirrored to a fair extent in many state administrative procedure
acts, has an exception for contracting out, because when it was
written, the drafters of the legislation were thinking of the kinds of
contracts that, for example, an agency would enter into with the
Xerox repair person.76 You are not going to have notice and com-
ment and public involvement as to who you are going to choose to
keep your Xerox machine functioning.
But, of course, the whole nature of contracting has changed dra-
matically. One way to look at contracts is to see them as a form of
rule-making in which there should be notice to the public and op-
portunities to comment.
Still another way to think of them is as treaties. I think this can
be a useful way to conceptualize these issues. You do not want to
bring to bear a lot of old thinking in the form of, New Deal kinds
of procedures that do not necessarily work in this new governance
area. But the international model is a useful one because there is
so much soft law and so many informational approaches to proce-
dure that one finds in provisions dealing with the compliance of
treaties. I think this can be a fruitful analogy.
This would not be based on a coercion model of procedure, but it
would be one based on compliance, and, most importantly, it
would institutionalize the kind of information flow that all of you
have been indicating is occurring now. It may be occurring in some
areas, but how do you restructure these contracts when you get the
public more widely involved in it? How do the contracts in ques-
tion appear to the public and are there opportunities along the way
for the public to intervene and express their views?
Finally, I believe it is difficult and probably impossible to sepa-
rate administration from policy-making. Policy-making does not
end when there is a public decision to contract out. Administration
74. See generally Aman, supra note 1 (discussing privatization in the global
context).
75. 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1994).
76. Id.
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and policy-making continue and there needs to be a public compo-
nent for that administration. But administrative lawyers have to be
careful not to import a lot of unnecessary procedures. We need to
be more creative than in the past. One way may be to develop the
informational aspects of procedure more fully through reporting
requirements and various ways in which citizens could petition to
have contracts amended if they do not appear to be working
properly.
The easy example is prisons. There are examples of private pris-
ons and private juvenile detention centers whose conditions are
abominable. Stories have appeared in the newspapers, and eventu-
ally citizens realize that something is wrong, and the private prov-
iders involved are more than a little embarrassed by that. We need
to institutionalize the possibility of this kind of public/private dia-
logue so that it can take place, when necessary.
PROFESSOR SALAMON: I just want to make note of the fact
that this book I mentioned has a chapter on accountability written
by the Director of the Budget Division of U.S. General Accounting
Office, Paul Posner, who has taken up precisely these questions.77
I think the fundamental message is that the traditional notions and
procedures of accountability have been changed and are beginning
to change. We have notions of negotiated rule-making, for exam-
ple, which is a fundamental shift from the standards of the Admin-
istrative Procedures Act.78 Instead of restricting and forbidding ex
parte involvement in the development of rules, it encourages and
creates a structure for it.
There have been similar changes in contracting, with the effect of
sometimes replacing old-style arm's-length contracting with vari-
ous forms of negotiated contracting with a restricted array of bid-
ders who are invited into the process.
So there are very fundamental shifts in the nature of accounta-
bility. Accountability remains a crucial issue and it explains why it
does make a difference that this is collective action and public ac-
tion, but the forms of accountability are changing quite
dramatically.
PROFESSOR SCLAR: One quick comment. When we talk
about accountability in terms of public contracts, we have to re-
member that one person's accountability is another person's red
tape. Part of the nature of the public sector is that it has not found
77. THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEW GOVERNANCE (Lester
M. Salamon ed., forthcoming 2001).
78. 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1994).
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a good way to protect public capital. Since it is everybody's capital,
it is nobody's capital, so we end up with the rules. The question
becomes: What adds value and what is just waste? We do not have
a good way yet to sort that out, but that is one of the problems.
MS. METZGER: I would like to thank the panelists.
MR. HATCH: I would like to thank our moderator, Gillian
Metzger, and all of our panelists for that terrific introduction to our
topic and transition to our second panel, which will look at "Public
Oversight of Public/Private Partnerships."
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